American Military Strategy Explains the Failure in Iraq
    By Laurent Zecchini
    Le Monde

    Friday 24 March 2006

    Why did the American Army lose the stabilization phase of the Iraq war? After the [initial] force phase had achieved its objectives, the US Army did not change its methods vis- -vis the population, continuing to rely on force and failing to seek the population's acceptance. If it behaved that way, it's because the entire American military culture and the training accorded every soldier push that logic. The proof was offered during a recent Fondation pour la recherche strat gique (FRS) [Foundation for Strategic Research] colloquium devoted to the "Quadrennial Defense Review" (QDR), the document that expresses the Pentagon's strategic vision.

    Colonel Gilles Rouby, of the French infantry summoned up the statements of British Brigadier (General) Nigel Aylwin-Foster, who served in Iraq up until November 2004 under American command and whose testimony was published in the American Army's magazine, Military Review.

    To emphasize the difference in approach between Americans and Europeans, Colonel Rouby contrasted the American and French "soldier's codes." "I am a warrior and the member of a team; I serve the people of the United States and live according to the Army's values.... I hold myself ready to be deployed, to engage (the enemy) and to destroy the enemies of the United States.... I am the guardian of freedom and the American way of life," pronounces the former. The French soldier's code is written very differently: "Master of my power, I respect the enemy and watch out to spare civilians. I obey orders, with respect for the laws, the customs of war, and international conventions.... I am open to the world and to society and respect diversity."

    This explains that? For General Aylwin-Foster, the US Army's operations approach is one of the factors that explain the coalition's failure to exploit the success of Saddam Hussein's fall. He emphasizes that, despite an operational experience turned almost exclusively toward stabilization since the fall of the Berlin Wall, stabilization "has never been considered central" by the American Army, which continues to organize itself around and train for conventional war operations (and not asymmetrical operations).

    The US Army, he notes, "is in the image of the American society it issues from: it aspires to get results very quickly," which incites the Pentagon to fix on military objectives disconnected from larger political objectives.

    The British officer cites statements of American soldiers whose testimony he gathered that illustrate that approach. "The military destruction of the enemy is the strategic objective.... Our allies are too reserved in their use of force, which encourages the insurgents to resist and demonstrates to the local population that we lack determination.... Given the pre-eminent role of coercive combat taught and practiced by our premier soldiers, it would be unreasonable and too complicated to expect that they develop the subtlety and mastery necessary to win hearts and minds during the stabilization and reconstruction phase.... Out of 123 pacification operations undertaken between May 2003 and May 2004, only 6% sought to create a secure environment for the population: the preferred tactic consisted of employing lethal force on a grand scale in the course of one-day raids."

    General Aylwin-Foster draws the conclusion that action without force is less natural for the Americans than for their allies. He highlights that in the face of the problems it has experienced, the American Army has systematically turned to technology to decrease contact with the population. He adds that "the very strong sense of moral authority in the US Army distorts the quality of its collective judgment."

    Translator's Note: Link to the complete article by Brigadier Aylwin-Foster cited in the article.