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Wesley Clark | Bush's "Surge" Will Backfire    [
Military "Surge" Not Enough to Save Iraq, US Commander Says    [

    A History of "Surges"
    By Retired Colonel Ann Wright
    t r u t h o u t | Columnist

    Monday 08 January 2007

Vietnam: from 21,000 advisors to 400,000 combat troops in two years.

    President Bush is strongly intimating that he will change US military commanders in Iraq and appoint generals who will not oppose his "surge" of from 20,000 to 40,000 in troop strength there. Current military commanders have opposed an increase of US military personnel in Iraq due to lack of clarity on missions, goals and exit strategies for the new forces.

    A look at US history in Vietnam sheds light on the potential for extraordinarily large increases in US military troop strength in a short time, unless there is a huge, vocal, visible outcry from us, the citizens, and from the Congress.

    In early 1964, the US had 16,000 military personnel in South Vietnam who were advisers to the South Vietnamese military. On July 27, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson ordered 5,000 additional military advisers to South Vietnam, bringing the total US troop level to 21,000.

    A week later, on August 4, the USS Maddox, a US Navy destroyer, was conducting an electronic intelligence-gathering mission four miles off the North Vietnamese coast when it was allegedly attacked by three torpedo boats of the North Vietnamese navy. President Johnson decided that the attack could not go unanswered and ordered retaliatory strikes against North Vietnamese ports and oil facilities.

    On the basis of the administration's assertions that the attacks were "unprovoked aggression" on the part of North Vietnam, on August 7, 1964, the US Congress approved the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which gave the president broad powers to conduct military operations without an actual declaration of war. The resolution passed unanimously in the House of Representatives and was opposed in the Senate by only two members. Tragically, neither Congress nor the American people learned that the incident was fabricated by the Johnson administration until the publication of the Pentagon Papers five years later, in 1969.

    In March 1965, 3,500 US Marines "surged" to be the first US combat troops in South Vietnam, adding to the 25,000 US military advisers already there. In May 1965, the 173d Airborne Brigade "surged" to become the first US Army ground unit committed to the conflict in South Vietnam.

    Seven months later, by November 1965, US military forces had "surged" to over 120,000. On November 27, Pentagon officials recommended that to defeat North Vietnamese troops and National Liberation Forces (NLF), US troop levels in South Vietnam would have to "surge" from 120,000 to 400,000.

    In a series of meetings between General Westmoreland and President Johnson held in Honolulu, Hawaii, in February 1966, the general argued that the US presence had succeeded in preventing the immediate fall of the South Vietnamese government, but that another troop "surge" would be necessary to conduct offensive operations to defeat North Vietnamese and NLF military forces.

    As a result of the Honolulu conference, President Johnson authorized a "surge" in troop strength to 429,000 by August 1966. So, in less than two years, the presidential "surge" in Vietnam had reached over 400,000 troops - from 21,000 in July 1964 to 429,000 in August 1966.

    Late in 1967, Westmoreland said that it was conceivable that in two years or less, US forces could be phased out of the war, turning over more and more of the fighting to the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN).

    Richard Nixon had campaigned for president in 1968 on a "secret plan to end the Vietnam War." But Nixon had no such plan, and the American involvement in Vietnam continued for another five years. The goal of the American military effort was to gradually build up the strength of the South Vietnamese armed forces and to re-equip them so that they could defend their nation on their own: the "Vietnamization" of the US effort. By October 1971, the total number of US forces in South Vietnam had dropped to 196,700, the lowest level since January 1966.

    On January 27, 1973, the Paris Peace Accords on "Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam" were signed, officially ending direct US involvement in the Vietnam War. President Nixon ordered the suspension of all offensive actions against North Vietnam, to be followed by a unilateral withdrawal of all US troops and an exchange of prisoners of war.

    The first US prisoners of war were released by North Vietnam on February 11, 1973. All US military personnel were ordered to leave South Vietnam by March 29, 1973. As an inducement for the South Vietnamese government to sign the Paris Peace Accords, Nixon had promised that the US would provide financial and limited military support, in the form of air strikes, so that the South Vietnamese government could continue to defend itself.

    In December 1974, the US Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, which cut off all military funding to the South Vietnamese government and made unenforceable the peace terms negotiated by Nixon. Nixon, threatened with impeachment because of Watergate, had resigned as president, and Nixon's vice-president, Gerald Ford, had stepped in to finish his term. Ford vetoed the Foreign Assistance Act, but his veto was overridden by Congress.

    By the end of April 1975, the weakened South Vietnamese military had collapsed on all fronts. On April 27, 100,000 North Vietnamese troops encircled Saigon, which was defended by only about 30,000 ARVN troops. On April 29, the US launched the largest helicopter evacuation in history and evacuated the remaining American employees and tens of thousands of Vietnamese.

    The Cost of the "Surge" in Vietnam:

• US killed in action, died of wounds, died of other causes, missing and declared dead - 57,690
• South Vietnamese civilian dead - 300,000
• South Vietnamese military killed - 243,748
• North Vietnamese civilian fatalities - 65,000
• The North Vietnam People's Army and NLF (combined) - 666,000
• Republic of Korea military killed - 4,407
• Australia and New Zealand (combined) military killed - 469
• Thailand military killed - 351

    What will be the cost of a "surge" in Iraq?

    How many Iraqis and how many Americans will die with this "surge," and for what reason?

    STOP THE SURGE!!!

    BRING OUR TROOPS HOME!

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    Ann Wright is a retired 29-year US Army Reserves Colonel and a former US diplomat. She resigned from the diplomatic corps in March 2003 in opposition to the Iraq war.

 

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    Go to Original

    Bush's "Surge" Will Backfire
    By Wesley Clark
    The Independent UK

    Sunday 07 January 2007

The rise in troop numbers could reduce the urgency for political effort.

    The odds are that President George Bush will announce a "surge" of up to 20,000 additional US troops in Iraq. But why? Will this deliver a "win"? The answers: a combination of misunderstanding and desperation; and, probably not.

    The recent congressional elections - which turned over control of both houses to the Democrats - were largely a referendum on President Bush, and much of the vote reflected public dissatisfaction with the war in Iraq. Most Americans see the US effort as failing, and believe that some different course of action must be taken. Most favour withdrawing forces soon, if not immediately. The report of the Iraq Study Group is widely seen as a formal confirmation of US failure in Iraq.

    The country's action there has been the very centrepiece of the Bush presidency. With two years left in office, he would, of course, try to salvage the situation. Many Americans remember the 1975 evacuation of the US embassy in Saigon, with desperate, loyal Vietnamese friends clinging to the skids of the American helicopters. No one wants that kind of an ending in Iraq. And our friends and allies in the region are also hoping for the US to pull some kind "rabbit from the hat", even if it seems improbable, for a US failure would have grave consequences in the region. Iran, especially, is the beneficiary of a failure, and al-Qa'ida will also try to claim credit.

    From the administration's perspective, a troop surge of modest size is virtually the only remaining action inside Iraq that will be a visible signal of determination. More economic assistance is likely to be touted, but in the absence of a change in the pattern of violence, infrastructure enhancement simply isn't practical. And if the President announces new Iraqi political efforts - well, that's been tried before, and is there any hope that this time will be different?

    As for the US troops, yes, several additional brigades in Baghdad would enable more roadblocks, patrols, neighbourhood clearing operations and overnight presence. But how significant will this be? We've never had enough troops in Iraq - in Kosovo, we had 40,000 troops for a population of two million. For Iraq that ratio would call for at least 500,000 troops, so adding 20,000 seems too little, too late, even, for Baghdad. Further, in a "clear and hold" strategy, US troops have been shown to lack the language skills, cultural awareness and political legitimacy to ensure that areas can be "held", or even that they are fully "cleared". The key would be more Iraqi troops, but they aren't available in the numbers required for a city of more than five million with no reliable police - nor have the Iraqi troops been reliable enough for the gritty work of dealing with militias and sectarian loyalties. Achieving enhanced protection for the population is going to be problematic at best. Even then, militia fighters in Baghdad could redeploy to other areas and continue the fight there.

    What the surge would do, however, is put more American troops in harm's way, further undercut US forces' morale, and risk further alienation of elements of the Iraqi populace. American casualties would probably rise, at least temporarily, as more troops are on the streets; we saw this when the brigade from Alaska was extended and sent into Baghdad last summer. And even if the increased troop presence initially intimidates or frustrates the contending militias, it won't be long before they find ways to work around the obstacles to movement and neighbourhood searches, if they are still intent on pursuing the conflict. All of this is not much of an endorsement for a troop surge that will impose real pain on the already overstretched US forces.

    There could be other uses for troops, for example, accelerating training for the Iraqi military and police. But even here, vetting these forces for their loyalty has proven problematic. Therefore, neither accelerated training nor more troops in the security mission can be viewed mechanistically, as though a 50 per cent increase in effort will yield a 50 per cent increased return, for other factors are at work.

    The truth is that, however brutal the fighting in Iraq for our troops, the underlying problems are political. Vicious ethnic cleansing is under way right under the noses of our troops, as various factions fight for power and survival. In this environment security is unlikely to come from smothering the struggle with a blanket of forces - it cannot be smothered easily, for additional US efforts can stir additional resistance - but rather from more effective action to resolve the struggle at the political level. And the real danger of the troop surge is that it undercuts the urgency for the political effort. A new US ambassador might help, but, more fundamentally, the US and its allies need to proceed from a different approach within the region. The neocons' vision has failed.

    Well before the 2003 invasion, the administration was sending signals that its intentions weren't limited to Iraq; Syria and Iran were mentioned as the next targets. Small wonder then that Syria and Iran have worked continuously to meddle in Iraq. They had reason to believe that if US action succeeded against Iraq, they would soon be targets themselves. Dealing with meddling neighbours is an essential element of resolving the conflict in Iraq. But this requires more than border posts, patrols and threatening statements. Iran has thus far come out the big winner in all of this, dispensing with long-time enemy Saddam, gaining increased influence in Iraq, pursuing nuclear capabilities and striving to enlarge further its reach. The administration needs a new strategy for the region now, urgently, before Iran can gain nuclear capabilities.

    America should take the lead with direct diplomacy to resolve the interrelated problems of Iran's push for regional hegemony, Lebanon and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Isolating adversaries hasn't worked. The region must gain a new vision, and that must be led diplomatically by the most powerful force in the region, the United States.

    Without such fundamental change in Washington's approach, there is little hope that the troops surge, Iraqi promises and accompanying rhetoric will amount to anything other than "stay the course more". That wastes lives and time, perpetuates the appeal of the terrorists, and simply brings us closer to the showdown with Iran. And that will be a tragedy for not just Iraq but our friends in the region as well.

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    Retired General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Commander of Nato, is a senior fellow at UCLA's Burkle Center for International Relations.

 

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    Go to Original

    Military "Surge" Not Enough to Save Iraq, US Commander Says
    By Nancy A. Youssef
    McClatchy Newspapers

    Sunday 07 January 2007

    Baghdad, Iraq - In his first wide-ranging interview, the No. 2 U.S. commander in Iraq conceded Sunday that a military "surge" escalation would not be enough to rescue Iraq, advocating economic and political changes as well, as top Democratic lawmakers in Washington stiffened their opposition to any escalation of U.S. troop strength.

    Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno said he believed that a combination of jobs, provincial elections, anti-militia legislation and stronger Iraqi security forces could stop the nation's plunge toward all-out civil war. Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, his predecessor, spelled out the same approach before his departure one month ago.

    By echoing his predecessor, Odierno's comments raised concerns in both Washington and Iraq that the U.S. war effort is exhausting old tactics that haven't worked. Indeed, many Iraqis do not trust that a new Baghdad security plan can change their circumstances because the U.S. and Iraqi government have touted at least five such plans before, all of which failed to stop the violence.

    The commander's statements came days before President Bush is to announce a new course for U.S. policy in Iraq, probably Wednesday. It's expected to include an escalation "surge" of between 9,000 and 30,000 U.S. troops, an increase in civilian advisers to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government and perhaps $1 billion in new aid for reconstruction efforts.

    In Washington Sunday, top Democratic lawmakers emphasized that they oppose any plan to escalate U.S. troop strength in Iraq, but made clear that they are not ready to cut off funds for troops there now. However, Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., said that Congress would scrutinize any Bush request to fund an escalated U.S. presence in Iraq.

    "The American people and the Congress support those troops. We will not abandon them. But if the president wants to add to this mission, he is going to have to justify it. And this is new for him, because up until now, the Republican Congress has given him a blank check with no oversight, no standards, no conditions, and we've gotten into this situation which is a war without end, which the American people have rejected," Pelosi said on CBS' "Face the Nation."

    On Friday, Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., sent Bush a public letter opposing any increase in U.S. troops in Iraq and calling for a phased redeployment of U.S. troops out of Iraq starting in four to six months.

    Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said Sunday that Bush's expected plan to escalate U.S. troop strength in Iraq "is a prescription for another tragedy." Biden also announced that he will seek the presidency in 2008.

    "There is now a civil war. You need a political solution," said Biden, speaking on NBC's "Meet the Press." His committee plans extensive hearings on Iraq in coming weeks.

    Taking the opposite view was Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

    "I support a surge with a purpose - co-joining with the Iraqi political and military leadership to control this country," Graham said, also on "Meet the Press." "We cannot let this country go into the abyss.

    "Now is the last chance, and the only chance, to get this right."

    Graham said many Republican lawmakers are prepared to back Bush's call for an escalation of U.S. forces in Iraq.

    In Baghdad, Odierno said he proposed several approaches to Defense Secretary Robert Gates during his visit here last month, including a surge.

    "What I will tell you is when Secretary Gates was here with General (Peter) Pace, we offered several different courses of action. Some included surge of troops, some included a surge in economic capabilities." Others, he said, included boosting other Iraqi capabilities in the treasury, justice, and rule of law fields, "and some didn't include a troop surge."

    Odierno arrived in Baghdad less than a month ago, replacing Chiarelli. During his tenure, Chiarelli repeatedly said that if more Iraqis had jobs, fewer would join a rogue group or shoot at American soldiers. The unemployment rate here is at least 25 percent, government officials estimate.

    Both commanders said they believed that Iraqi forces should take the lead in enforcing security, while conceding that, while they are improving, Iraqis have faltered when given the lead. Some forces have been overtly sectarian. Others lost control of their communities, forcing U.S. troops to intervene. Both commanders said that U.S. troops should be on the periphery of areas handed over to Iraqi forces in case violence erupts.

    Both said that U.S. forces must tackle not only Sunni insurgents but Shiite militias - yet both stopped short of advocating that U.S. forces go after firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who leads Iraq's largest militia, the Mahdi Army, and supports the Iraqi government.

    "I'm not sure we take him down," Odierno said. "There are some extreme elements (of the Mahdi Army) ... and we will go after them. I will allow the government to decide whether (Sadr) is part of it or not. He is currently working within the political system."

    Both Odierno and Chiarelli said that the military could not do everything and that Iraq needs a political solution. Both also said that everyone should be patient with Iraq's nascent government, noting that it has been in power less than a year.

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