Chirac's Plan to Exit the Crisis
    An interview of French President Jacques Chirac by B atrice Gurrey,
    Patrick Jarreau, Natalie Nougayr de and R my Ourdan
    Le Monde

    Wednesday 26 July 2006

    How can the present crisis in the Middle East be solved?

    A meeting on Lebanon has been convened in Rome. Its primary objective is solving humanitarian problems. The number of victims, the number of people displaced, the massive destruction, notably in Lebanon, of all the equipment necessary for life creates a humanitarian situation that is becoming dramatic and that demands a response from the international community. The Americans have mentioned a sum of 30 million dollars to be allocated to humanitarian aid in Lebanon. France, already very committed in humanitarian aid overall, has decided to make a significant gesture. I've requested that a supplementary 15 million Euros be allocated to humanitarian aid in Lebanon. And, as I requested, humanitarian corridors will be created.

    The second point is political. It is essential that the international community agree on the outline of a political arrangement to be implemented after a cease-fire. The essential is that there be a cease-fire, which assumes that the Israeli soldiers taken by Hezbollah, as moreover must the soldier taken by Hamas, be freed. But it is essential to have a cease-fire first. That's the prerequisite.

    This cease-fire involves two requirements. On the one hand, the security of Israel, which must be assured, and on the other hand, the real application on the ground of UN Resolution 1559.

    There will not be a stable and democratic Lebanon, as is its already-confirmed vocation, if a part of its territory escapes the government's authority and is under the sole authority of militia. That's what Resolution 1559 clearly indicated, and that's what must be effected.

    All Lebanese - who are a very old people, an old civilization that has surmounted in the course of its history every possible ordeal, including its own propensity to contend within itself - must understand that there is no stable, democratic state, such as they want, if the government's authority does not extend over the entirety of its territory.

    That implies Hezbollah's retreat from southern Lebanon, an agreement on the Chebaa farms, and an agreement on an exchange of prisoners, notably a return of Lebanese prisoners now in Israel. All that with, later, for support, a multinational force to assure the implementation of these dispositions.

    Do you call for an immediate cease-fire?

    I wish it. For there is no military solution to this problem. And if it needed demonstration, the drama that UNIFIL has just experienced shows that the situation is deteriorating on the ground. Striking UNIFIL, where French soldiers are also serving, wounded the international community's peace force. One can only condemn this action, which demonstrates more than ever the urgency of putting a stop to the fighting.

    In this conflict, responsibilities are obviously shared. What is certain is that the method used, the strikes on Gaza on the one hand and on Lebanon afterward are, in my opinion, disproportionate. Moreover, I can understand many things, but I don't believe in a military solution to this kind of conflict.

    A cease-fire means that all the conditions come together. That's the priority. That those conditions be easy to implement: that is another problem. I am perfectly well aware of its complexity. But from the moment that no military solution exists, a cease-fire becomes necessary. Its modalities must be discussed.

    Between what parties could the political agreement you spoke of be negotiated?

    This political agreement, which assumes a cease-fire, must be negotiated, on the one hand, between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah, and, on the other hand, between the international community, Israel, and Lebanon.

    Does it still seem inopportune to you to describe Hezbollah as a terrorist organization?

    It is not at the moment when we want to try to bring Hezbollah, if possible, back into the bosom of the Lebanese community and to effect its transformation into a political party that questions of this nature should be raised.

    How do you envisage an international force in Lebanon and what would France's role be?

    The multinational force is based on imperative conditions. The first is the acceptance of a cease-fire by all the protagonists. The second is the acceptance of the principle itself of an international force by the different parties. And the third is that this international force fall under the UN's Chapter VII.

    The mandate for this force must be very carefully crafted. There is first of all a political objective, the recovery by the legal Lebanese government of its entire sovereignty over the totality of its territory. That is a sine qua non condition. There is also a military objective, which is to give restructured and assisted Lebanese forces the ability to deploy over all of Lebanon and to assure the country's security.

    This intervention force must have means, resources, and rules of engagement adapted to its mission.

    The deployment zone must be coherent with its mission. Its mission would be to manage the cease-fire and to assure respect for the borders, both the Israeli-Lebanese and the Syrian-Lebanese borders, naturally. It's a question of making sure that the area where Hezbollah would have withdrawn to in principle be totally demilitarized. And, finally, the mission of this force is to assure that no rocket fire of whatever nature may be effected against Israel.

    Furthermore, it will be necessary to deal with the security of the Israeli-Palestinian border.

    As far as France is concerned, NATO does not have the vocation to set up such a force. For technical, but also political reasons, NATO is not structured for this type of intervention. NATO is perceived, whether we like it or not, as the armed fist of the West is these regions, and, consequently, in terms of image, NATO does not have that vocation.

    If Hezbollah rejects disarmament and if Israel accepts a scenario for the settlement of the conflict, who would disarm Hezbollah? The international force? The Lebanese army?

    That's one of the real questions. I don't think that an international force - under the hypothesis that no political settlement could be obtained - has the ability or the mission to disarm Hezbollah. That's for the Lebanese government to do. Which implies a political agreement. Hezbollah is presently in the Lebanese government. One can very well imagine - in any case, hope - that Hezbollah could draw conclusions from its presence in the very heart of the government and transform itself into a political force. Hence the necessity to have a minimum of contact between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah. Hezbollah, disarmed, has the vocation to be a political force in Lebanon.

    Do you envisage an international force deployed between Israel and the Palestinians?

    We have always deemed that there should also be a form of international presence to facilitate the security of the Israeli-Palestinian border. The mandate and the framework for it will naturally be different [from the other force].

    Must and can Syria bear upon the situation in Lebanon?

    I should be tempted to talk about Iran first of all, the position of which is still more important than that of Syria. There's the nuclear problem, and then there's Iran in the region, and I think those two questions should not be mixed up. A negotiation is on course with Iran. I am sorry that Iran did not respond sooner. I think that Iran must subject itself to international rules, and that from that point of view, it must understand that an agreement in conformity with the rules of the international community, that is, with respect to non-proliferation, is in everyone's interest, and in its interest. I remind you that the proposals made to Iran are substantial: complete cooperation with respect to nuclear power, economic cooperation, and a dialogue on security questions in the region.

    I add that it's not the "Three" [Germany, France, and Great Britain] that have made these proposals to Iran. The Americans, the Russians, and the Chinese have joined them. Consequently, it's the whole of the international community. We have indicated that if there is no agreement, we'd have to go to the Security Council and envisage more restrictive formulae, including sanctions. But we're not there now.

    We were somewhat disappointed that Iran waited to respond. There may, however, be internal political problems that lead it to take its time; I don't know about that; I have no opinion on that point. I very much desire that Iran bring a positive response to bear on the opening that has been offered it, because that means that in some way or another - and now we leave the nuclear realm to speak of regional matters - we recognize what is legitimate: Iran's right to defend a position in the region. Iran is an old civilization, a great country. Its anxiety to count in the region is legitimate. We can't act as though it doesn't exist. We must resume normal relations with Iran.

    Iran, moreover, bears a share of responsibility in the present conflict. The information we have available proves that sophisticated arms and financing have been sent by Iran, most likely through Syria, to Hezbollah. That's a problem.

    But one can talk with Iran. I'd like to remind you that during the Lebanese elections, there was a period during which we wondered what Hezbollah's reaction would be with respect to those elections. Would they be contested? At the time, we contacted Iran and I must note that Iran was rather cooperative.

    Do you think that the July 12th start of the crisis bears Iran's imprint?

    I don't want to accuse anyone. I feel that Hamas as well as Hezbollah did not take these irresponsible initiatives simply on their own. That's my impression.

    As for Syria, I believe it's a slightly different problem. Syria has, I must say, a minority and specific regime that is at once judge and party [in Lebanon] and which took the obligation to withdraw its troops - 15,000 men - after thirty years of occupation rather badly. With the political, economic, and social consequences that implied. I would not feel the same way about Syria as about Iran.

    What Syria could better do to protect itself and to protect its population, notably its standard of living, its development, is to not seek to revenge itself on Lebanon. That risks being very dangerous for Syria.

    What place could France take in a multinational force?

    I believe that in the end the United States, for lack of a more effective, faster, or better solution, would only see the advantages, or no solution other than NATO's intervention - that is, to be precise, NATO's Reaction Force (NRF), which would be commanded by the European Corps' General Staff comprising Germany, France, Belgium, and Spain.

    I add that, according to what we believe we understand, the Americans would desire the immediate dispatch of this force, which would be in some way charged with putting the cease-fire into effect.

    I told you why I think there must be a cease-fire first, then a political commitment, and after that, a multinational force on the ground for the missions that I just talked about. I repeat, I don't think NATO as such would be a good solution. If not NATO, what? Another expression of the international community, that is, of nations who volunteer to constitute an international force of this nature. I am sure we can find a certain number of them.

    That we could find a nation or framework capable of assuring command is less certain, because there aren't many nations that would be ready to do it.

    Would France be ready to do it?

    France has always assumed its responsibilities in Lebanon. It will decide according to a certain number of conditions. We want to have a cease-fire, a policy commitment and an international force charged with applying that policy in strictly defined conditions. At that time, we'll see.

    We get the impression that in spite of some differences, there is all the same a rather large harmony between the American and the French positions in this matter ...

    We want peace; there is no discussion about that. We have, together, in fact, each of us, imposed Resolution 1559. That did not happen by some operation of the Holy Ghost. It's the result of a common action between the United States and France. It's a determining element in the region's stability. From that point of view, we have a common approach. Perhaps we don't have exactly the same hidden agendas. I don't know about that. But we have had the same action. That doesn't mean that we always have the same position.

    So, with respect to Hezbollah's disarmament, there's agreement between France, the United States, and Israel?

    With respect to the necessity of applying Resolution 1559, there's a general agreement.

    The American Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, said that the time has come for a "new Middle East." To what point do you fear that the Americans are pursuing their own project for the region's transformation?

    I do not want to create prejudice, nor still less put intentions on trial. What is certain is that you don't change regions by force. This crisis is the fruit of a very long and very complex history. We are not at all in the situation of 1982 or 1996. Things have evolved. There has been the war in Iraq, the consequences of which are far from being over, which has in some way displaced the lines in this region and has not simplified them, to say the least. This situation seems more and more worrying to me.

    There has been a definite development in the relations between Shiites and Sunnis, and - something that worries me enormously - a hardening between global Islam and the West. And what goes with that is a certain propensity towards the development of terrorism.

    Do you believe Iraq is experiencing civil war?

    If it's not a civil war, it's not far from one. There are permanent clashes and, as one could have feared from the outset, an explosion of Iraq - which is the worst solution for the region - is in the process, I would not say of happening, but of becoming a threat. That said, France not having been involved in the matter, it would be inappropriate to give lessons.

    Are you in favor of an American withdrawal from Iraq?

    From Iraq, undoubtedly. The problem is that it's very difficult because the presence of American troops is at once necessary and a source of worry there. But I don't think it's possible to have a perspective for the re-establishment of civil peace in Iraq without giving the Iraqis the feeling that they are truly sovereign. I believe that there must be, on a date that remains to be examined and determined, notably with the new Iraqi authorities whom we support, the perspective of a departure of foreign forces.

    What means does France have available to make the solution you have described for Lebanon prevail?

    I shall say: common sense. That does not mean it always triumphs. We have clearly said what we think. We have a certain traditional, historic knowledge of this region. We probably benefit from a certain trust, in the large sense of the term, on the part of the Lebanese and also from their environment in the Arab world. And Israel cannot doubt for an instant that for us its security is an element about which no concession is possible. That allows us all the same to defend a certain experience.

    How can there be progress without dialogue with Syria?

    There was a time when I spoke with Bachar al-Assad. I spoke to his father. So as not to hide anything from you, that dialogue has been interrupted. It was he who wanted to. And then I realized that it led nowhere. That the regime incarnated by Bachar al-Assad seemed to me largely incompatible with peace and security.

    Does that mean you're in favor of "regime change" in Damascus?

    I would certainly not add an element of additional complexity to a situation that does not demand it.

    Are the two problems, Lebanon and Palestine, linked?

    They are different problems, even if there's an overall problem. We mentioned the problem of Lebanon by recalling that the key to its solution is Resolution 1559. For Palestine, the key is to resume discussions, first of all with Mahmoud Abbas. When he came to Paris, since Ehud Olmert also came, I felt that dialogue was about to resume. Both men gave me the feeling that they were going to speak to one another again and commit to the path of two states, side by side, independent, with their security and viability guaranteed. I was rather optimistic.

    I wonder to what extent Hamas was inspired in this provocation from outside. I don't know anything about it. What is certain is that the riposte has been disproportionate there too and that everything has been interrupted. There's no other solution than a resumption of negotiations, which would lead Hamas little by little to accept the three points demanded of it: renunciation of violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of the commitments undertaken by the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]. That's the solution.

    What is Teheran's responsibility?

    The situation in Lebanon and nuclear matters are two separate issues that must be treated as such. The Middle East affair is altogether different. Iran has certain preoccupations: asserting itself as a power - its desire to master nuclear techniques flows from that - and to assert itself as a power that exists, that counts, in the region.

    That has two consequences. First, Iran wants to have normal relations with the rest of the world, notably with the United States. Secondly, it wants to give its point of view when regional problems are at issue, given that it is a regional power.

    It's normal to have a dialogue with Iran. Then we shall consider the consequences. There is no possible concession with respect to the nuclear matter. That's why I say it's a separate problem and will be settled if necessary in the Security Council. For the rest, everything will depend on Iran's behavior. I reminded you of its cooperative attitude at the time of the Lebanese elections. We saw then the influence Iran could have on Hezbollah and its willingness to listen to the councils of moderation that were then offered. Perhaps things have gone beyond that point, but diplomacy is also made from memories.