Remarks of Senator Carl Levin at the Brookings Institution
    t r u t h o u t | Speech

    Wednesday 13 December 2006

Seminar on US national security policy issues.

    Thank you to the Brookings Institution for hosting this seminar on U.S. National Security Policy Issues and for always putting wise policies and the greater good ahead of any political party. For the past 90 years, Brookings has provided a forum for discussing how to make America fairer, stronger, and safer, and this forum continues in that tradition.

    You may have already heard my ideas about Iraq, and I just want to assure you that I take no joy in repeating myself. So, let me pledge to you today - as the President stands up and faces reality in Iraq, I will stand down!

    Clearly, Iraq is the overriding national security issue today. We have been bogged down in this war for more than three and a half years, which is longer than the Korean Conflict or our involvement in World War II. The war has cost nearly 3,000 American lives, seven times that many wounded, and around $330 billion.

    And yet for a war that is costing us dearly in blood and treasure, the mantra from the Bush Administration has only been the bumper sticker slogan: "stay the course." The President even made the incredible claim a few weeks ago that "absolutely we're winning" in Iraq. As the President's own choice for Secretary of Defense has acknowledged, however, we are not winning in Iraq, and we need to change course if we have hope of stabilizing that country. Even Secretary Rumsfeld has said "It is time for a major adjustment."

    Three things have happened recently to change the dynamic here at home on the need to change the dynamic in Iraq. First, the elections in November were a major blow to the President's stay-the course-policy. The American people rose up against staying the course in Iraq, because that course is not working.

    The testimony of the new Secretary of Defense, Dr. Gates, was a second significant blow to the President's policy. With compelling directness, Dr. Gates made clear he believes we need to change course. He was so direct that two "stay-the-course Republicans" voted against confirmation, with one of them saying that: "Mr. Gates has repeatedly criticized our efforts in Iraq."

    And the release last week of the Iraq Study Group Report was an additional blow to "stay the course."

    Before proposing to you the way of changing course that I believe holds out the only hope of succeeding, let me give you the premise on which it is based: the violence will end only if the Iraqis resolve their political differences.

    I actually believe that a consensus exists about the validity of that fundamental point: only a political solution among the Iraqi leaders themselves can salvage that country. Such a political settlement is the rock, the foundation, upon which a new strategy must be built.

    General Peter Chiarelli, Commanding General of the Multi-National Corps in Iraq stated last week: "We need a commitment by all Iraqis of all of the ethno-sectarian groups to commit first to nonviolence and to resolving their differences through the political process. This situation cannot be resolved by military forces alone." He continued: "I happen to believe that we have done everything militarily we possibly can."

    At his confirmation hearing, I asked Dr. Gates: "Do you believe that the end to violence in Iraq requires a political settlement and that we need to communicate a sense of urgency to the Iraqis to pressure them to reach a settlement that only their politicians can reach?" And Dr. Gates replied: "Yes, sir, I do."

    The Iraq Study Group Report stated that the violence in Iraq cannot be stopped or even contained "if there is no underlying political agreement among Iraqis about the future of their country."

    Last month, I asked the Director of Central Intelligence, General Hayden: "Is a political settlement by the Iraqis essential, in your judgment, if failure is to be avoided in Iraq?" And General Hayden replied: "Absolutely. I believe that, in fact, the parties have to be brought together and it has to be a political approach. And the government of Iraq has to be in the lead in doing that."

    And most telling perhaps was Iraq Prime Minister Maliki's acknowledgement of this essential point a few weeks ago when he stated: "The crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of innocents are the politicians."

    All of the other debates - about troop levels, embedding more advisors, training of Iraqi forces, and other issues - are secondary. For instance, although the question of whether to embed U.S. troops with Iraqi units is a serious issue, it doesn't get to the heart of the issue because that is a military question.

    Likewise, the question is not how many trained and capable battalions there are in the Iraqi army. The question is whether that army is loyal to a sectarian cause or to the whole country. That's a problem requiring a political resolution.

    If a political settlement among the Iraqis is the right goal, how do we get there? How do we persuade, pressure, cajole, or inspire the Iraqi leaders to come to a political solution? How do we get them to make the compromises that only they can make?

    I believe the only way to stop the Iraqi leaders' fiddling while Baghdad burns is to tell them that our presence in Iraq is not open-ended. We need to deliver a cold dose of reality to the Iraqi leaders and tell them that we are not going to be their security blanket without end and that we will begin a phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq within four to six months.

    Nothing will get the attention of the Iraqi leaders like the prospect of some American troops leaving Iraq. When they finally understand that our military presence in Iraq is neither permanent nor unconditional, they are far more likely to take the political steps necessary to deal with sectarian violence and to defeat the insurgency.

     It will not be easy. It will require concession and compromise on all sides. The militias must be disarmed to avoid all-out civil war, political power and oil revenues must be equitably distributed among regions and peoples so Iraqis believe they have a stake in the Iraq nation. No, it won't be easy, but a fair political settlement in Iraq is the only hope.

    The Iraq Study Group specifically drew the connection between the importance of ending the open-ended commitment of American troops and persuading the Iraqis to make political compromises. Their report said the following: "An open-ended commitment of American forces would not provide the Iraqi government the incentive it needs to take the political actions that give Iraq the best chance of quelling sectarian violence. In the absence of such an incentive, the Iraqi government might continue to delay taking those difficult actions."

    But whether or not most agree that that form of pressure is needed, at least I can confidently say that in one area there is a near consensus: that we need to change course in Iraq by pressing for a political settlement. That consensus needs to grow by one more person - President Bush, who has an opportunity later this week to show a willingness to at least take one important step in a new direction.

    Up to now, the President's policy has been the epitome of an open-ended commitment. For example, the President said a few weeks ago that "we are going to stay in Iraq as long as the Iraqis ask us to be there." That open-ended commitment gives the dangerous impression to the Iraqis that their future is in our hands, instead of theirs. It removes the pressure from the Iraqis to take responsibility for their security. It suggests we can save them from themselves.

    That was not the first time the President has made an open-ended commitment to the Iraqis. It's been a constant refrain. For instance, after Iraq's President Talabani met with President Bush in September, he said that President Bush had assured him that the U.S. troops "will remain [in Iraq] until we ask them to leave."

    The President's position contains the same flaw that General Abizaid has pointed to when explaining why it would be unwise to increase the number of U.S. troops. General Abizaid stated: "We want the Iraqis to do more. It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us ... More American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future."

    Last week, I met with President Bush, and I urged him directly to end the open-ended commitment of American troops to Iraq, which his statement makes. He responded that my point was "well taken."

    This weekend, there is a national reconciliation conference taking place in Baghdad. The Iraqi participants at that meeting know the results of our election in November; they heard Dr. Gates' testimony at his confirmation hearing; and they have likely read the report of the Iraq Study Group. But they also know that the voice that matters most is the President's. They know that pressure is building in America, but that the President continues to provide them with soothing assurances that 'we're there until the Iraqis ask us to leave.'

    This week, the President needs to send a new message to the Iraqis in advance of their conference and make that "well-taken" point: the U.S. commitment to Iraq is not open-ended and not unconditional. If he does, it could be the beginning of a critical course correction that is long overdue.