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Huge Force Readying Crackdown in Baghdad •
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CBO: Iraq Surge Could Actually Total 50,000
By Rick Maze
Army Times
Friday 02 February 2007
A new congressional report says the increase of 21,500 combat troops for Iraq
proposed by the Bush administration could result in up to 50,000 troops actually
being deployed to the region.
The report from the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office bases that projection
on the fact that the Bush plan is unclear about whether the 21,500 troops needed
to quell violence are all combat troops or if that number already includes support
forces.
"Over the past few years, DoD's practice has been to deploy a total of
about 9,500 per combat brigade to the Iraq theater, including about 4,000 combat
troops and about 5,500 supporting troops," says the five-page report requested
by Rep. John Spratt, D-S.C., the House Budget Committee chairman, and Rep. Ike
Skelton, D-Mo., the House Armed Services Committee chairman.
Spratt, the budget committee chairman and the second-ranking Democrat on the
armed services committee, notes that about $379 billion already has been spent
on the war in Iraq and a request for an additional $100 billion is expected
next week.
"An average of 170,000 military personnel has been maintained in the Iraq
theater of operations, and this high deployment level has taken a toll,"
he said, noting that last year, the Defense Department cut troops' time at home
between deployments from two years to one so it could have enough people to
deploy.
Spratt said the report raises the question of whether even one year at home
between deployments can be guaranteed. "The Pentagon will probably have
to relax 'dwell-time' standards even more," Spratt said, using the military
phrase to describe time at home between deployments.
Skelton said the report "appears to conflict with the estimate given by
the chief of staff of the Army in his testimony. We will want to carefully investigate
just how big the president's troop increase really is. Is it 21,500 troops,
or is it really closer to 33,000 or 43,000?"
At a Jan. 23 hearing, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker said he believed
the 21,500 increase included four support battalions. "Right now, we do
not anticipate there will be increased combat service support requirements over
what is now embedded inside of the brigade combat teams we have," Schoomaker
said.
Army spokesman Lt. Col. Gary Kolb said Schoomaker's Jan. 23 comments before
members of the House Armed Services Committee are "still accurate."
The support needs of the additional five brigade combat teams will be satisfied
by the current support network in Iraq and the support units embedded within
those teams, Kolb said Feb. 1.
But the additional support troops included in the budget office estimates are
based on the possibility that Schoomaker is wrong, an armed services committee
aide said. "While Schoomaker initially said it wouldn't take extra support
troops, CBO doesn't believe that is possible," said an aide to Skelton.
The key point of the report is to try to determine how much the new Iraq strategy
might cost. The report estimates it would cost $9 billion to $13 billion for
a four-month deployment and $20 billion to $27 billion for a one-year deployment
of the additional 21,500 troops. Those expenses would be on top of the $8 billion
to $13 billion a month for the current force of about 135,000 deployed in Iraq.
The report says the Pentagon "has identified only combat units for deployment"
and has not yet indicated which support units will be deployed.
"Army and DoD officials have indicated that it will be both possible and
desirable to deploy fewer additional support units than historical practice
would indicate," the report says. "Even if the additional brigades
required fewer support units than historical practice suggests, those units
would still represent a significant additional number of military personnel."
Under the administration's plan, the force increase - already under way
- will reach its peak in May. The plan calls for a three-month buildup
with a similarly gradual decline when the mission is done. The report does not
try to estimate how long the mission might last, looking at only the cost to
sustain it for various lengths of time.
Skelton said in a statement that cost is a major issue. "We were concerned
that the full financial cost of the escalation would never be made clear to
the American people," he said.
"What the CBO found concerns me," Skelton said. Part of his worry
is based on Schoomaker's assertion that additional support troops are not needed.
Skelton worries combat troops might not have the combat support and combat service
support needed if the administration tries to hold down the number of deployed
troops.
Rep. Martin Meehan, D-Mass., chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee
on oversight and investigations that has launched a review of Iraq-related costs,
said he also is concerned. "I am disturbed that the administration's figures
may not be fully accounting for what a true force increase will entail; if combat
troops are deployed, their support needs must not be shortchanged," Meehan
said in a statement.
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Staff writer Matthew Cox contributed to this story.
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Huge Force Readying Crackdown in Baghdad
The Associated Press
Thursday 01 February 2007
Baghdad - U.S. Army engineers have torn down houses and surrounded the newly
cleared space with razor wire atop concrete blast walls for neighborhood bases,
the first outward signs of the coming Baghdad security crackdown.
American and Iraqi commanders are pulling together a force that numbers -
on paper at least - about 90,000 troops for what many see as a last-chance
drive to curb the debilitating violence that has turned Baghdad into a battleground
and killed - according to the United Nations - more than 34,000 civilians
last year alone.
"This will be a difficult mission and time is not on our side," Lt. Gen.
David Petraeus, who will soon take over the U.S. command in Iraq, said in written
testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee last month.
In the past eight months, two U.S.-Iraqi security missions have failed to rout
gunmen, bombers, suicide attackers and the death squads that haunt Baghdad's
streets after dark. The U.S. military blamed Iraq's Shiite-dominated government
for its inability to muster sufficient troops.
Of the 90,000-troop force now assembling for a new try at calming the capital,
more than half were to be Iraqi soldiers and police, a large majority of whom
are Shiite Muslims.
It remains an open question whether those forces will be any more inclined
this time to battle heavily armed fellow Shiite militiamen or Sunni insurgents,
including al-Qaida in Iraq and its suicide bombers.
This operation to sweep the capital of Sunni insurgents and Shiite militiamen
was widely expected to begin early this month. But a senior Iraqi general told
The Associated Press this week that "preparations are not complete."
The general refused to say how many of an expected influx of about 8,000 Iraqi
forces had arrived - as advertised - from the Kurdish north, the Shiite south
or Fallujah, in the insurgent stronghold of Anbar province west of Baghdad.
Local commanders, however, said only about 2,000 of the additional troops had
reached Baghdad or were nearby. The general and the commanders all spoke on
condition of anonymity because of security reasons.
The Baghdad security plan, announced Jan. 6 by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki
and four days later by President Bush, includes an infusion of 21,500 additional
American troops to Iraq, 17,500 of them to Baghdad.
The U.S. Congress, with a new Democratic majority, has been embroiled for weeks
in debate about sending more Americans to a conflict that already has stretched
to nearly four years and taken the lives of nearly 3,100 U.S. service members
and hundreds more American contract workers.
And departing U.S. commander Gen. George Casey told a Senate panel Thursday
he didn't think such a large additional force was necessary.
"I believe that the job in Baghdad, as it's designed now, can be done with
less than that," Casey said. "But having the flexibility to have the other
three brigades on a deployment cycle gives us and gives Gen. Petraeus great
flexibility."
U.S. and Iraqi officials say the United States plans to have about 41,000 troops
in Baghdad and the region when all additional 17,500 American forces arrive
by late spring. There are currently about 15,000 in and around the capital and
an estimated 8,500 were expected to arrive from other parts of the country.
The Iraqis say they have about 22,000 troops in the capital, more than half
at the airport and in two nearby towns. There about 20,000 police and Interior
Ministry troops and commandos also in the city, according the Defense and Interior
ministries. The additional 8,000 scheduled to arrive from elsewhere would put
the total Iraqi forces at about 50,000.
But the overall Iraq troop count is an extrapolation from the number of battalions
deployed or on the way. Experience has shown far fewer troops show up.
"The Iraqi numbers are probably inflated. Battalions that should contain 800
men usually have no more than 200-300, if that," said retired Army Col. Douglas
Macgregor, an adviser to former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld in 2003.
An Iraqi army brigade from Irbil, about 3,000 men in principle, will have at
most 1,500 men when it finally arrives in Baghdad. The commander says 95 percent
of the men don't speak Arabic. A brigade from Sulaimaniyah, also in the Kurdish
north, has reached the Muthana Airport in central Baghdad, but it is only 1,000-men
strong, not the expected 3,000.
Three brigades each were expected from the 8th and 10th army divisions in the
south of the country. Some of the troops have reached positions outside Baghdad,
but their force-strength was not known.
U.S. military officials have said that about one-third of any Iraqi unit is
missing at any given time because soldiers must return to their home towns and
villages to deliver their paychecks to families. Iraq's banking system is too
primitive to allow the electronic transfer of money.
And those absences do not include soldiers missing because they don't want
to serve in a particular mission. There are no laws against failure to muster
for the country's new, volunteer force.
But U.S. preparations were moving ahead in Baghdad.
In the tough Ghazaliyah neighborhood, a Sunni enclave in northwest Baghdad,
Army engineers put up the concrete blast walls topped with razor wire to enclose
a region where six homes were cleared. The area, including open space surrounding
the structures, will house the 1st Cavalry Division's Company C, 2nd Battalion,
12th Cavalry Regiment.
"Command Outpost Wildcard is under construction to allow soldiers to quickly
respond to violence and crime in the area. The former residents of the homes
were paid to vacate the area homes and have relocated," the military said in
a statement. It could not be learned what compensation was paid to those who
surrendered their homes.
A brigade of the 82nd Airborne has arrived in Baghdad as part of the Bush-ordered
infusion of troops. Four more brigades were to arrive between now and the end
of May. The next arriving unit was to be the 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division,
based at Ft. Riley, Kan., which will deploy in February.
The 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, based at Ft. Benning, Ga., will deploy
in March. The 4th Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, based at Ft. Lewis,
Wash., in April, and the 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, based at Ft. Stewart,
Ga., in May.
The Marine Corps will extend two reinforced infantry battalions for approximately
60 days. Additionally, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations
Capable) will remain in Iraq for approximately 45 additional days. The 1st Brigade,
34th Infantry Division, Minnesota Army National Guard, will be extended in its
current mission for up to 125 days and will redeploy not later than August.
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