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US Pushed Allies on Iraq, Diplomat Writes
By Colum Lynch
The Washington Post
Sunday 23 March 2008
Chilean envoy to UN recounts threats of
retaliation in run-up to invasion.
United Nations - In the months leading up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq,
the Bush administration threatened trade reprisals against friendly countries
who withheld their support, spied on its allies, and pressed for the recall
of U.N. envoys that resisted U.S. pressure to endorse the war, according to
an upcoming book by a top Chilean diplomat.
The rough-and-tumble diplomatic strategy has generated lasting "bitterness"
and "deep mistrust" in Washington's relations with allies in Europe,
Latin America and elsewhere, Heraldo Munoz, Chile's ambassador to the United
Nations, writes in his book "A Solitary War: A Diplomat's Chronicle of
the Iraq War and Its Lessons," set for publication next month.
"In the aftermath of the invasion, allies loyal to the United States were
rejected, mocked and even punished" for their refusal to back a U.N. resolution
authorizing military action against Saddam Hussein's government, Munoz writes.
But the tough talk dissipated as the war situation worsened, and President
Bush came to reach out to many of the same allies that he had spurned. Munoz's
account suggests that the U.S. strategy backfired in Latin America, damaging
the administration's standing in a region that has long been dubious of U.S.
military intervention.
Munoz details key roles by Chile and Mexico, the Security Council's two Latin
members at the time, in the run-up to the war: Then-U.N. Ambassadors Juan Gabriel
Vald¿s of Chile and Adolfo Aguilar Zinser of Mexico helped thwart
U.S. and British efforts to rally support among the council's six undecided
members for a resolution authorizing the U.S.-led invasion.
The book portrays Bush personally prodding the leaders of those six governments
-- Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico and Pakistan -- to support the war
resolution, a strategy aimed at demonstrating broad support for U.S. military
plans, despite the French threat to veto the resolution.
In the weeks preceding the war, Bush made several appeals to Chilean President
Ricardo Lagos and Mexican President Vicente Fox to rein in their diplomats and
support U.S. war aims. "We have problems with your ambassador at the U.N.,"
Bush told Fox at a summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in Los Cabos,
Mexico, in late 2002.
"It's time to bring up the vote, Ricardo. We've had this debate too long,"
Bush told the Chilean president on March 11, 2003.
"Bush had referred to Lagos by his first name, but as the conversation
drew to a close and Lagos refused to support the resolution as it stood, Bush
shifted to a cool and aloof 'Mr. President,' " Munoz writes. "Next
Monday, time is up," Bush told Lagos.
Senior U.S. diplomats sought to thwart a last-minute attempt by Chile to broker
a compromise that would delay military action for weeks, providing Iraq with
a final chance to demonstrate that it had fully complied with disarmament requirements.
On March 14, 2003, less than one week before the invasion, Chile hosted a meeting
of diplomats from the six undecided governments to discuss its proposal. But
then-U.S. Ambassador John D. Negroponte and then-Secretary of State Colin L.
Powell moved quickly to quash the initiative, warning them that the effort was
viewed as "an unfriendly act" designed to isolate the United States.
The diplomats received calls from their governments ordering them to "leave
the meeting immediately," Munoz writes.
Aguilar Zinser, who died in 2005, was forced out of the Mexican government
after publicly accusing the United States of treating Mexico like its "back
yard" during the war negotiations. Vald¿s was transferred
to Argentina, where he served as Chile's top envoy, and Munoz, a Chilean minister
and onetime classmate of Condoleezza Rice at the University of Denver, was sent
to the United Nations in June 2003 to patch up relations with the United States.
In the days after the invasion, the National Security Council's top Latin American
expert, John F. Maisto, invited Munoz to the White House to convey the message
to Lagos, that his country's position at the United Nations had jeopardized
prospects for the speedy Senate ratification of a free-trade pact. "Chile
has lost some influence," he said. "President Bush is truly disappointed
with Lagos, but he is furious with Fox. With Mexico, the president feels betrayed;
with Chile, frustrated and let down."
Munoz said relations remained tense at the United Nations, where the United
States sought support for resolutions authorizing the occupation of Iraq. He
said that small countries met privately in a secure room at the German mission
that was impervious to suspected U.S. eavesdropping. "It reminded me of
a submarine or a giant safe," Munoz said in an interview.
The United States, he added, expressed "its displeasure" to the German
government every time they held a meeting in the secure room. "They couldn't
listen to what was going on."
Munoz said that threats of reprisals were short-lived as Washington quickly
found itself reaching out to Chile, Mexico and other countries to support Iraq's
messy postwar rehabilitation. It also sought support from Chile on issues such
as peacekeeping in Haiti and support for U.S. efforts to drive Syria out of
Lebanon. The U.S.-Chilean free trade agreement, while delayed, was finally signed
by then-U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick in June 2003.
Munoz said that Rice, as secretary of state, called him to ask for help on
a U.N. resolution that would press for Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. The United
States had secured eight of the nine votes required for adoption of a resolution
in the Security Council. Munoz had received instructions to abstain. "I
talked to [Lagos], and he listened to my argument, and we gave them the ninth
vote," he said.
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