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US to Heighten Afghan Role?
By Gordon Lubold
The Christian Science Monitor
Friday 25 April 2008
Pentagon weighs lead role in NATO's combat
mission in the south to better fight Taliban.
Washington - The Pentagon is considering whether it should push to change the
NATO mission in volatile southern Afghanistan to give the US greater control
in the fight against a growing Taliban threat.
The move is one of many being assessed as fears rise that the collective effort
of NATO forces there lacks coherence. The Taliban's comeback over the past two
years has been marked by a spike in suicide bombings and other violence -
at the same time that critics say the complex command structure governing NATO
and US forces has stifled combat and reconstruction efforts.
American officials see a possible answer in modeling the southern region after
the east, which falls under NATO but is led by a subordinate US command and
viewed as relatively successful.
The issue is not a new one, but has been overshadowed by the need for more
forces in Afghanistan. With new commitments by some allies in place, the focus
now is on creating more workable relationships on the ground - without
conjuring images of "American bullying," as one retired US officer
puts it, among allies whose commitments already hang by a slender thread.
All discussion is in "incubation," says a Pentagon official with
firsthand knowledge of the situation, and a decision is still some months away.
"This is the sausage being made," says the official, who like others
quoted in this article asked not to be named due to the sensitivity of the discussions.
Support for change comes from outside the military as well. "I think there
is a strong rationale for making that command and control much more efficient,"
Seth Jones, a political scientist at the Rand Corp., told a House panel this
month. "We have multiple US chains of command that go through European
Command, Central Command, Special Operations Command," he said. "I
think there are a range of options on the table about making that arrangement
more efficient."
NATO took over what was a security-and-stabilization effort, but is now confronting
a combat mission in some of the country's most dangerous provinces. The size
of the 61,000-member force, about half of which is American, with the rest from
39 countries, remains a major challenge for commanders. Also of concern is their
view that troops as well as provincial reconstruction teams can be more responsive
to their countries' domestic concerns than to the commanders under whom they
technically fall.
But a particularly thorny issue is the frequent rotations of commands. The
southern sector rotates a new subordinate coalition command every nine months.
The current Canadian commander, for example, will be replaced by a Dutch counterpart
by the end of the year. The frequency of change allow the Taliban to exploit
the seams of those transitions, critics say.
In contrast, the Americans cast the US-led eastern sector as successful, in
part because of the longer tours - 12 to 15 months or more.
"You get American soldiers and their leaders who establish, maintain,
and exploit relationships with the terrain, the indigenous people, and their
leadership and their enemy to a fare-thee-well," says Gen. Dan McNeill,
senior NATO commander based in Kabul.
"Each time you get a change in nationality in one of these commands, the
Afghans as well as the international force have to make adjustments," says
General McNeill, who believes the overall strategy in Afghanistan is working
and that the larger command structure is succeeding. But he acknowledges that
the frequency of rotations in the south is "probably not the most helpful."
Many others believe the overall command needs overhaul. "I have to believe
that all my instincts and experience tells me that it ain't working well,"
says one senior American officer with intimate knowledge of the mission.
But requesting that the coalition forces in the south essentially expand on
their commitment by extending their forces is not seen as a simple change.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates, typically quick to address issues as they arise,
has so far been reluctant to make changes, following the advice of the Pentagon's
Joint Staff earlier this year. On Wednesday, Gates said there are always efforts
under way to make sure the mission is as effective as possible, but didn't hint
at a new approach anytime soon.
"There's been a lot of discussion in this building about whether we have
the best possible command arrangements in Afghanistan," he said. "I've
made no decisions."
Meanwhile, Afghanistan is as much a political mission as it is a combat and
reconstruction one, say military commanders and analysts.
The coalition there is in many ways as important as the mission itself, and
is a test of the overall NATO alliance, military commanders and analysts say
"The fact that we have problems with some allies is in no way an indication
that we have problems with all the allies," says Anthony Cordesman, a senior
fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in
Washington. "We couldn't have done what we could without them."
Many coalition forces are watching the US closely to gauge the extent of its
commitment to the Afghanistan mission. The nomination of Gen. David Petraeus,
an expert in counterinsurgency and now the top commander in Iraq, to lead US
Central Command could mean a new emphasis on what Afghanistan needs.
Gates has indicated he will send more US forces to Afghanistan some time in
2009, something that depends partly on how many troops are brought home from
Iraq. But there is discussion of sending a division headquarters and or an additional
brigade there.
At the same time, discussion is ongoing about other options for improving the
effectiveness of the command structure, in addition to the US assuming more
responsibility in the south. Some Pentagon officials believe that the head of
the NATO coalition in Afghanistan, a four-star general, should be "dual-hatted."
In addition to reporting to the NATO leadership in Brussels, he should also
have a direct link to Washington.
Supporters of this plan believe Washington's direct input would help to bring
more unity of effort to the mission. Another, perhaps more politically palatable,
option is to add a new American three-star general to oversee all American forces.
That commander would serve as a deputy to the NATO commander but would also
answer directly to Washington.
David Barno, who retired from the Army after serving as the senior NATO commander
in Afghanistan, testified before the same House panel that the loss of the senior
US commander who had directly answered to Washington hurts the mission. Now,
the senior NATO commander only answers directly to NATO.
"I think [it is] a disturbing trend again, given the importance of this
mission," he said.
Any of these changes would require approval of the NATO alliance.
Other senior military veterans would like to see "tactical areas of responsibility"
drawn that would allow the various forces to "own their own battle space."
This would allow them to operate as independently as possible from one another
unencumbered by the political reluctance of one country or the military bureaucracy
of another.
But if the next administration is to eschew the go-it-alone strategy, the US
must find a way to create coalitions that rise above the sum of their parts,
analysts say. Working with other countries on what amount to basic organizational
issues is ultimately the answer, says one retired officer.
"If the nature of future conflict is going to be a coalition, and we have
enough recent examples to show that we put troops at risk if we greatly encumber
command and control," says one retired officer. "Then you have to
come up with a solution to this."
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