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The New Geopolitics of Energy
By Michael T. Klare
The Nation
Monday 19 May 2008 Edition
While the day-to-day focus of US military planning remains Iraq and Afghanistan,
American strategists are increasingly looking beyond these two conflicts to
envision the global combat environment of the emerging period - and the world
they see is one where the struggle over vital resources, rather than ideology
or balance-of-power politics, dominates the martial landscape. Believing that
the United States must reconfigure its doctrines and forces in order to prevail
in such an environment, senior officials have taken steps to enhance strategic
planning and combat capabilities. Although little of this has reached the public
domain, there have been a number of key indicators.
Since 2006 the Defense Department, in its annual report Military Power of the
People's Republic of China, has equated competition over resources with conflict
over Taiwan as a potential spark for a US war with China. Preparation for a
clash over Taiwan remains "an important driver" of China's military
modernization, the 2008 edition noted, but "analysis of China's military
acquisitions and strategic thinking suggests Beijing is also developing capabilities
for use in other contingencies, such as conflict over resources." The report
went on to suggest that the Chinese are planning to enhance their capacity for
"power projection" in areas that provide them with critical raw materials,
especially fossil fuels, and that such efforts would pose a significant threat
to America's security interests.
The Pentagon is also requesting funds this year for the establishment of the
Africa Command (Africom), the first overseas joint command to be formed since
1983, when President Reagan created the Central Command (Centcom) to guard Persian
Gulf oil. Supposedly, the new organization will focus its efforts on humanitarian
aid and the "war on terror." But in a presentation delivered at the
National Defense University in February, Africom's deputy commander, Vice Adm.
Robert Moeller, said, "Africa holds growing geostrategic importance"
to the United States - with oil a key factor in this equation - and that among
the key challenges to US strategic interests in the region is China's "Growing
Influence in Africa."
Russia, too, is being viewed through the lens of global resource competition.
Although Russia, unlike the United States and China, does not need to import
oil and natural gas to satisfy its domestic requirements, it seeks to dominate
the transportation of energy, especially to Europe. This has alarmed senior
White House officials, who resent restoration of Russia's great-power status
and fear that its growing control over the distribution of oil and gas in Eurasia
will undercut America's influence in the region. In response to the Russian
energy drive, the Bush Administration is undertaking countermoves. "I do
intend to appoint...a special energy coordinator who could especially spend
time on the Central Asian and Caspian region," Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February. "It is
a really important part of diplomacy." A key job of the coordinator, she
suggested, would be to encourage the establishment of oil and gas pipelines
that bypass Russia, thereby diminishing its control over the regional flow of
energy.
Taken together, these and like moves suggest that a momentous shift has occurred.
At a time when world supplies of oil, natural gas, uranium and key industrial
minerals like copper and cobalt are beginning to shrink and the demand for them
is exploding, the major industrial powers are becoming more desperate in their
drive to gain control over what remains of the planet's untapped reserves [for
more evidence of major shortages in fossil fuels, see Klare, "Beyond the
Age of Petroleum," November 12, 2007, and Mark Hertsgaard, "Running
on Empty," May 12]. These efforts typically entail intense bidding wars
for supplies on international markets - hence the record high prices for all
these commodities. But they also take military form, as arms transfers and the
deployment of overseas missions and bases. It is to bolster America's advantage - and
to counter similar moves by China and other resource competitors - that the Pentagon
has placed resource competition at the center of its strategic planning.
Alfred Thayer Mahan Revisited
This is not the first time that American strategists have placed a high priority
on the global struggle over vital resources. At the end of the nineteenth century
a bold and outspoken group of military thinkers, led by naval historian and
Naval War College president Alfred Thayer Mahan and his protégé,
then-Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, campaigned for a strong
American Navy and the acquisition of colonies to ensure access to overseas markets
and raw materials. Eventually, their views helped generate public support for
the Spanish-American War and, upon its conclusion, the establishment of a Caribbean
and Pacific empire by the United States.
During the cold war, ideology reigned supreme as containment of the USSR and
the defeat of Communism were the overriding objectives of American strategy.
But even then, resource considerations were not entirely neglected. The Eisenhower
Doctrine of 1957 and the Carter Doctrine of 1980, though couched in the standard
anti-Soviet rhetoric of the day, were principally intended to ensure continued
US access to the Persian Gulf's prolific oil reserves. And when President Carter
established the nucleus of Centcom in 1980, its primary responsibility was protection
of the Persian Gulf oil flow - not containment of the Soviet Union.
After the cold war, the first President Bush tried, and failed, to establish
a global coalition of like-minded states - a "new world order" - that
would maintain global stability and allow Western corporate interests (American
firms foremost among them) to extend their reach across the planet. This approach,
in watered-down form, was subsequently embraced by President Clinton. But 9/11
and the current Administration's relentless campaign against "rogue states,"
notably Iraq under Saddam Hussein and Iran, has reinjected an ideological element
into US strategic planning. As George W. Bush tells it, the "war on terror"
and rogue states are the contemporary equivalents of earlier ideological struggles
against Fascism and Communism. Examine the issues closely, however, and it is
impossible to disentangle the problem of Middle Eastern terrorism or the challenge
posed by Iraq and Iran from the history of Western oil extraction in those regions.
Islamic extremism of the sort propagated by Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda has
many roots, but one of its major claims is that the Western assault on and occupation
of Islamic lands - and the resulting defilement of Muslim peoples and cultures - has
been driven by the West's craving for Middle Eastern oil. "Remember too
that the biggest reason for our enemies' control over our lands is to steal
our oil," bin Laden told his sympathizers in a December 2004 audiotaped
address. "So give everything you can to stop the greatest theft of oil
in history."
Likewise, the US conflict with Iraq and Iran has largely been shaped by the
fundamental tenet of the Carter Doctrine: that the United States will not permit
the emergence of a hostile power that might gain control over the flow of Persian
Gulf oil and thus - in Vice President Cheney's words - "be able to dictate
the future of worldwide energy policy." The fact that these countries might
be seeking weapons of mass destruction only complicates the task of neutralizing
the threat they pose, but it does not alter the underlying strategic logic.
Concern over the safety of vital resource supplies has, therefore, been a central
feature of strategic planning for a long time. But the attention now devoted
to this issue represents a qualitative shift in US thinking, matched only by
the imperial impulses that led to the Spanish-American War a century ago. This
time, however, the shift is driven not by an optimistic faith in America's capacity
to dominate the world economy but by a largely pessimistic outlook regarding
the future availability of vital resources and the intense competition over
them waged by China and other rising economic dynamos. Faced with these dual
challenges, Pentagon strategists believe that ensuring US primacy in the global
resource struggle must be the top priority of American military policy.
Back to the Future
In line with this new outlook, fresh emphasis is being placed on the global
role of the Navy. Using language that would sound surprisingly familiar to Alfred
Mahan and the first President Roosevelt, the Navy, Marines and Coast Guard unveiled
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower in October; it emphasizes America's
need to dominate the oceans and guard the vital sea lanes that connect this
country to its overseas markets and resource supplies:
Over the past four decades, total sea borne trade has more than quadrupled:
90% of world trade and two-thirds of its petroleum are transported by sea. The
sea-lanes and supporting shore infrastructure are the lifelines of the modern
global economy.... Heightened popular expectations and increased competition
for resources, coupled with scarcity, may encourage nations to exert wider claims
of sovereignty over greater expanses of ocean, waterways, and natural resources - potentially
resulting in conflict.
To address this danger, the Defense Department has undertaken a massive modernization
of the combat fleet, entailing the design and procurement of new aircraft carriers,
destroyers, cruisers, submarines and a new type of "littoral combat"
(coastal warfare) ship - an endeavor that could take decades to complete and
consume hundreds of billions of dollars. Elements of this plan were unveiled
by President Bush and Defense Secretary Gates in the budget proposal for Fiscal
Year 2009, submitted in February. Among the big-ticket items highlighted in
the shipbuilding budget are:
- $4.2 billion for the lead ship of a new generation of nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers;
- $3.2 billion for a third Zumwalt class missile destroyer; these warships
with advanced stealth capabilities will also serve as a "testbed"
for a new class of missile cruisers, the CG(X);
- $1.3 billion for the first two littoral combat ships;
- $3.6 billion for another Virginia class submarine, the world's most
advanced undersea combat vessel in production.
Proposed shipbuilding programs will cost $16.9 billion in FY 2009, on top of
$24.6 billion voted in FY 2007 and FY 2008.
The Navy's new strategic outlook is reflected not only in the procurement of
new vessels but also in the disposition of existing ones. Until recently most
naval assets were concentrated in the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean and
the Northwest Pacific in support of American forces assigned to NATO and the
defense pacts with South Korea and Japan. These ties still figure prominently
in strategic calculations, but ever-increasing weight is placed on the protection
of vital trade links in the Persian Gulf, the Southwest Pacific and the Gulf
of Guinea (close to Africa's major oil producers). In 2003, for example, the
head of the US European Command declared that the aircraft carrier battle groups
under his command would be spending fewer months in the Mediterranean and "half
their time going down the west coast of Africa."
A similar outlook is guiding the realignment of overseas bases, which has been
under way for the past several years. When the Bush Administration came into
office, most major bases were in Western Europe, Japan or South Korea. Under
the prodding of then-Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, however, the Pentagon began
to relocate forces from the outer fringes of Eurasia to its central and southern
regions - especially East-Central Europe, Central Asia and Southwest Asia - as
well as to North and Central Africa. True, these areas are home to Al Qaeda
and the Middle Eastern "rogue states" - but they also contain 80 percent
or more of the world's oil and natural gas, as well as reserves of uranium,
copper, cobalt and other critical industrial materials. And, as noted, it is
impossible to separate the one from the other in US strategic calculations.
A case in point is the US plan to maintain a basing infrastructure to support
combat operations in the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia. American ties with
states in this area were established several years before 9/11, to protect the
flow of Caspian Sea oil to the West. Believing that the Caspian basin could
prove a valuable new source of oil and natural gas, President Clinton worked
assiduously to open the doors to US involvement in the area's energy production;
aware also of the endemic ethnic antagonisms in the region, he sought to bolster
the military capabilities of friendly local powers and to prepare for possible
intervention by American forces. President Bush later built on these efforts,
increasing the flow of US military aid and establishing bases in the Central
Asian republics.
A corresponding mix of priorities governs the Pentagon's plans to retain a
constellation of "enduring" bases in Iraq. Many of these installations
will no doubt be used to support continuing operations against insurgent forces,
for intelligence activities or for the training of Iraqi army and police units.
Even if all US combat troops are withdrawn in accordance with plans announced
by senators Clinton and Obama, some of these bases will probably be retained
for the training activities they say will continue. At least some bases, moreover,
are specifically earmarked for the protection of Iraqi oil exports. In 2007,
for example, the Navy revealed that it had established a command-and-control
facility atop an offshore Iraqi oil terminal in the Persian Gulf to oversee
the protection of vital terminals.
A Global Struggle
No other major power is capable of matching the United States when it comes
to the global deployment of military power in the pursuit or protection of vital
raw materials. Nevertheless, other powers are beginning to challenge this country
in various ways. In particular, China and Russia are providing arms to oil and
gas producers in the developing world and beginning to enhance their military
capacity in key energy-producing areas.
China's drive to gain access to foreign supplies is most evident in Africa,
where Beijing has established ties with the oil-producing governments of Algeria,
Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Sudan. China has also sought access
to Africa's abundant mineral supplies, pursuing copper in Zambia and Congo,
chromium in Zimbabwe and a range of minerals in South Africa. In each case the
Chinese have wooed suppliers through vigorous diplomacy, offers of development
assistance and low-interest loans, high-visibility cultural projects - and, in
many cases, arms. China is now a major supplier of basic combat gear to many
of these countries and is especially known for its weapons sales to Sudan - arms
that reportedly have been used by government forces in attacks on civilian communities
in Darfur. Moreover, like the United States, China has supplemented its arms
transfers with military-support agreements, leading to a steady buildup of Chinese
instructors, advisers and technicians, who now compete with their US counterparts
for the loyalty of African military officers.
Much the same process is under way in Central Asia, where China and Russia
cooperate under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
to provide arms and technical assistance to the military forces of the Central
Asian "stans" - again competing with the United States to win the loyalty
of local military elites. In the 1990s Russia was too preoccupied with Chechnya
to pay much attention to this area, and China was likewise consumed with other
priorities, so Washington enjoyed a temporary advantage; in the past five years,
however, Moscow and Beijing have made concerted efforts to gain influence in
the region. The result has been a far more competitive geopolitical environment,
with Russia and China, linked through the SCO, gaining ground in their drive
to diminish US influence.
A clear expression of this drive was the military exercise the SCO conducted
last summer, the first of its kind to feature participation by all member states.
The maneuvers involved some 6,500 personnel from China, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and took place in Russia and China. Aside
from its symbolic significance, the exercise was indicative of China's and Russia's
efforts to enhance their capabilities, placing a heavy emphasis on long-range
assault forces. For the first time, a contingent of Chinese airborne troops
were deployed outside Chinese territory, a clear sign of Beijing's growing assertiveness.
To ensure that the intended message of these exercises did not go unnoticed,
the presidents of China and Russia used the occasion of an accompanying SCO
summit in Kyrgyzstan to warn the United States (though not by name) against
meddling in Central Asian affairs. In calling for a "multipolar" world,
for example, Vladimir Putin declared that "any attempts to solve global
and regional problems unilaterally are hopeless." For his part, Hu Jintao
noted, "The SCO nations have a clear understanding of the threats faced
by the region and thus must ensure their security themselves."
These and other efforts by Russia and China, combined with stepped-up US military
aid to states in the region, are part of a larger, though often hidden, struggle
to control the flow of oil and natural gas from the Caspian Sea basin to markets
in Europe and Asia. And this struggle, in turn, is but part of a global struggle
over energy.
The great risk is that this struggle will someday breach the boundaries of
economic and diplomatic competition and enter the military realm. This will
not be because any of the states involved make a deliberate decision to provoke
a conflict with a competitor - the leaders of all these countries know that the
price of violence is far too high to pay for any conceivable return. The problem,
instead, is that all are engaging in behaviors that make the outbreak of inadvertent
escalation ever more likely. These include, for example, the deployment of growing
numbers of American, Russian and Chinese military instructors and advisers in
areas of instability where there is every risk that these outsiders will someday
be caught up in local conflicts on opposite sides.
This risk is made all the greater because intensified production of oil, natural
gas, uranium and minerals is itself a source of instability, acting as a magnet
for arms deliveries and outside intervention. The nations involved are largely
poor, so whoever controls the resources controls the one sure source of abundant
wealth. This is an invitation for the monopolization of power by greedy elites
who use control over military and police to suppress rivals. The result, more
often than not, is a wealthy strata of crony capitalists kept in power by brutal
security forces and surrounded by disaffected and impoverished masses, often
belonging to a different ethnic group - a recipe for unrest and insurgency. This
is the situation today in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, in Darfur and southern
Sudan, in the uranium-producing areas of Niger, in Zimbabwe, in the Cabinda
province of Angola (where most of that country's oil lies) and in numerous other
areas suffering from what's been called the "resource curse."
The danger, of course, is that the great powers will be sucked into these internal
conflicts. This is not a far-fetched scenario; the United States, Russia and
China are already providing arms and military-support services to factions in
many of these disputes. The United States is arming government forces in Nigeria
and Angola, China is aiding government forces in Sudan and Zimbabwe, and so
on. An even more dangerous situation prevails in Georgia, where the United States
is backing the pro-Western government of President Mikhail Saakashvili with
arms and military support while Russia is backing the breakaway regions of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. Georgia plays an important strategic role for both countries
because it harbors the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, a US-backed conduit
carrying Caspian Sea oil to markets in the West. There are US and Russian military
advisers/instructors in both areas, in some cases within visual range of each
other. It is not difficult, therefore, to conjure up scenarios in which a future
blow-up between Georgian and separatist forces could lead, willy-nilly, to a
clash between American and Russian soldiers, sparking a much greater crisis.
It is essential that America reverse the militarization of its dependence on
imported energy and ease geopolitical competition with China and Russia over
control of foreign resources. Because this would require greater investment
in energy alternatives, it would also lead to an improved energy economy at
home (with lower prices in the long run) and a better chance at overcoming global
warming.
Any strategy aimed at reducing reliance on imported energy, especially oil,
must include a huge increase in spending on alternative fuels, especially renewable
sources of energy (solar and wind), second-generation biofuels (those made from
nonedible plant matter), coal gasification with carbon capture and burial (so
that no carbon dioxide escapes into the atmosphere to heat the planet) and hydrogen
fuel cells, along with high-speed rail, public transit and other advanced transportation
systems. The science and technology for these advances is already largely in
place, but the funding to move them from the lab or pilot-project stage to full-scale
development is not. The challenge, then, is to assemble the many billions - even
trillions - of dollars that will be needed.
The principal obstacle to this herculean task is the very reason for its necessity
in the first place: massive spending on the military dimensions of overseas
resource competition. I estimate that it costs approximately $100 billion to
$150 billion per year to enforce the Carter Doctrine, not including the war
in Iraq. Extending that doctrine to the Caspian Sea basin and Africa will add
billions. A new cold war with China, with an accompanying naval arms race, will
require trillions in additional military expenditures over the next few decades.
This is sheer lunacy: it will not guarantee access to more sources of energy,
lower the cost of gasoline at home or discourage China from seeking new energy
resources. What it will do is sop up all the money we need to develop alternative
energy sources and avert the worst effects of global climate change.
And this leads to a final recommendation: rather than engage in militarized
competition with China, we should cooperate with Beijing in developing alternative
energy sources and more efficient transportation systems. The arguments in favor
of collaboration are overwhelming: together, we are projected to consume 35
percent of the world's oil supply by 2025, most of which will have to be imported
from dysfunctional states. If, as is widely predicted, global oil reserves have
begun to shrink by then, both of our countries could be locked in a dangerous
struggle for dwindling supplies in chronically unstable areas of the world.
The costs, in terms of rising military outlays and the inability to invest in
more worthwhile social, economic and environmental endeavors, would be staggering.
Far better to forswear this sort of competition and work together on the development
of advanced petroleum alternatives, super-fuel-efficient vehicles and other
energy innovations. Many American and Chinese universities and corporations
have already initiated joint ventures of this sort, so it is not hard to envision
a much grander regime of cooperation.
As we approach the 2008 elections, two paths lie before us. One leads to greater
reliance on imported fuels, increased militarization of our foreign fuel dependency
and prolonged struggle with other powers for control over the world's remaining
supplies of fossil fuels. The other leads toward diminished reliance on petroleum
as a main source of our fuel, the rapid development of energy alternatives,
a reduced US military profile abroad and cooperation with China in the development
of innovative energy options. Rarely has a policy choice been as stark or as
momentous for the future of our country.
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Michael T. Klare, defense correspondent of The Nation, is a professor
of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College. His newest book, Rising
Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy, will be published by
Metropolitan Books in April.
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