Iraq: May the Quagmire Remain!
    By Hussein Agha
    Le Monde

    Thursday 24 May 2007

    If you believe Middle East official discourse, everyone deplores the American presence in Iraq and everyone calls for an immediate departure. The Saudi sovereign himself, even though he is Washington's closest Arab ally, has described the occupation as "illegal" and "illegitimate." And yet, between the words expressed and hidden intentions, there is a chasm. The region's states and political groups, pushed by their public opinion, will scarcely admit it, but they have no desire to see the Americans withdraw any time soon.

    There's a simple reason for that: While the United States is no longer in a position to manipulate regional actors, the regional actors themselves have learned how to use the American presence to promote their own objectives. Silently, and contrary to popular convictions, they have succeeded in prolonging the American occupation, dazzling the occupants with the chimera of a possible victory. The suppositious axis of the so-called "moderate" Arab states - comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan - fears a rapid American departure.

    First of all, because that would be interpreted as an American defeat, which would simultaneously weaken these pro-American regimes and radicalize public opinion in their countries. Then, if the United States leaves, the emergence of a Shiite regime in Iraq - a disastrous possibility in their eyes - would only be a matter of time. In the face of the Arab world's hostility, that regime would necessarily turn its eyes eastward to strengthen its ties with its Iranian co-religionists by that much more.

    For most Arab regimes, that would represent a considerable challenge and would unleash a whole series of serious events: an Iranian-Iraqi alliance; Arab political and material support for Iraq's militant Sunni movements; retaliation from Iraqi forces; and - in the end - the threat of a regional conflagration.

    Finally, an American withdrawal would risk leading to a partition of Iraq. From the point of view of a number of Arabs, the occupation is what holds the country together: As long as coalition forces are present, total fragmentation may be avoided. As soon as the American troops are no longer there, however, the likelihood of a partition will increase, which would represent an existential threat for the territorial integrity and security of the states in the region. The diverse secessionist tendencies, numerous, but latent, could be aroused just about everywhere. Still worse, the end of modern Iraq would call into question the legitimacy of the fundamental principles of the nation, the state, and Arab borders.

    Paradoxically, the rival axis of the so-called "rogue" states - Syria and Iran - also takes a benignant view of the American presence. As long as it's bogged down in the Iraqi quagmire, the United States will have to think twice before embarking on a similar military expedition in a neighboring country. That's due to political considerations - the quagmire serving as a sobering reminder of the failure of the invasion - but also to military concerns. American resources are virtually exhausted and will stay that way as long as the occupation goes on. Moreover, American forces in Iraq present so many targets for an Iranian or Syrian counter-attack should the need for that be felt. So, overall, whether they're right or wrong, Damascus and Tehran both consider that the occupation of Iraq constitutes the most solid insurance policy against possible American aggression.

    For Turkey, the presence of American forces means that Iraqi Kurds' nationalist aspirations will not give rise to an independent state in good and due form - a red line for Ankara which has to deal with its own Kurdish minority. Turkey does not appreciate the possibility of an Iraqi Shiite state allied to Iran and open to Kurdish claims - a situation that it believes the occupation makes less likely.

    Israel also believes that a rapid withdrawal of American forces would be a disaster. Already, nothing has weakened Israel's deterrent force more than the American performance in Iraq - a performance that serves as inspiration for Israel's enemies, now convinced that even the most powerful military force in the world can be brought to its knees. A precipitous departure, especially combined with the disastrous summer 2006 war in Lebanon, would put Israel in a delicate situation, strengthening Iran and giving Syria hope of recovering the Golan militarily.

    There are also risks for the smaller states of the Gulf. With their significant Shiite populations and their strong dependence on the United States, they would be threatened by an accelerated withdrawal. In Bahrain, which harbors a disillusioned and oppressed Shiite majority, the effect could be immediate.

    Within Iraq, it is the hour for diverse political groups to consolidate. They are strengthening their political and military abilities, clarifying their political objectives and preparing themselves for approaching challenges.

    It's not the time for a global confrontation. No group possesses either the confidence or the capacity necessary to confront its rivals within its own community or within enemy communities. In the same way, for the moment, no group is really interested in a true process of national reconciliation, while they all deem that they can improve their position in the future. The perpetuation of the American presence helps them on two levels: On the one hand, it permits a moderation in the intensity of fighting; on the other, it allows them to push political engagement off until later.

    The Shiites present in the government would like the United States to stay for as long as it takes to consolidate their power over the levers of the state, and to construct a loyal military apparatus. The Shiites outside the government would like the US to stay as long as necessary to avoid a premature confrontation with their rivals. Militant Shiite groups may simultaneously accuse the occupation forces of being responsible for their community's ills and attack them to cement their own popular support. For their part, the Shiites allied to Iran are in a position to avenge potential anti-Iranian American actions by conducting attacks against American forces in Iraq.

    Al-Qaeda and its allies are the ones who, perhaps, derive the greatest benefit from the occupation. They have installed themselves in Iraq, attracted new recruits, conducted operations against the Americans and have been strengthened. They are in absolutely no hurry at all to see the Americans leave the country and take away so many easy targets. Other armed Sunni groups need the Americans for analogous reasons and also to protect them from the Shiites. For Sunni politicians, the occupation is the last rampart against a total Shiite hegemony over the institutions of the state.

    Of all the ethnic groups, the Kurds have been the most adroit at using the Americans. Benefiting from United States's protection, they are sheltered from their historic enemies (Arabs and Turks), have built quasi-state institutions, and live in relative calm and prosperity. They have no desire for the situation to change.

    Like the regimes of the neighboring countries, the Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds of Iraq are united in their desire and ability to use the American presence in order to pursue distinct - and most often contradictory - political objectives. The gap that separates the feelings of ordinary people - in Iraq as elsewhere in the region, frankly hostile to the occupation - from the political calculations of their leaders - who gauge all the advantages they derive from it, at least for the moment - is enormous.

    In the midst of dark and gloomy scenes, the Americans appear less certain and more confused than all the others. Armed with inaccessible goals, supplied with incoherent plans, constantly changing tactics, and with losses of life and resources that are constantly growing, they understand neither what they want nor how to obtain it. They saw themselves as manipulators; they have become the ones who are manipulated. Which all illustrates an old Arab adage: The magic has taken possession of the magician.

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    Hussein Agha is a professor of Middle-Eastern studies at Oxford University.