Army Rule Disguised as "Democracy"
By J. Sri Raman
t r u t h o u t | Columnist
Thursday 26 July 2007
"Bangladesh can be important to Pakistan's political development in another
way. It can be the model for the Pakistan army to reduce its involvement in
the politics of the country."
Thus spake William B. Milam. It can be pleaded in defense of the former US
ambassador to Pakistan and Bangladesh that he wrote these lines in a newspaper
column before former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed was arrested in Dhaka.
It can also be asked, however, if the event would have affected the euphoric
assessment of the role the army is playing in Bangladesh. The answer cannot
be in the affirmative, considering that the George W. Bush administration has
carefully avoided any comment upon the arrest.
Washington and its representatives in Dhaka, however, hastened to welcome the
announcement by the army-backed caretaker government of a "roadmap"
for the long-delayed general election in Bangladesh. It made no difference to
the crusader for "democracy" that a major step towards the election,
not mentioned in the "roadmap," was the detention (and possible disqualification
for the contest) of a former prime minister and the leader of the country's
largest political party.
The crusader seems convinced that a new type of "democracy" - or
a new version of military dictatorship - is the need of the hour for a swathe
of South Asia. Bush and his band are engaged in a brave new experiment for not
only Bangladesh and Pakistan, but also Nepal. Here is a country-by-country report
on the crusade.
In Bangladesh, "democracy" of the desired kind, obviously, is one
in which the army approves of the contending forces in the forthcoming general
election and, consequently, its outcome. The "roadmap" for the election,
promised to be held before the end of 2008, may not say this in so many words,
but accompanying action speaks louder than words.
The action against the leader of the Awami League (AL), expected to keep her
out of the election, followed repeated, abortive attempts at keeping her out
of the country. She could return home from a personal visit abroad only after
she was stopped from boarding a flight at London's Heathrow Airport in April
and the international community protested. The army had also made several attempts
(one of them almost successful) to exile former Prime Minister Begum Khaleda
Zia, leader of the AL's main political adversary, the Bangladesh National Party
(BNP).
The action came also after imposition of crippling restrictions on political
activities of all kinds, including indoor political meetings, so defined as
to disallow even consultations among party leaders. The "roadmap,"
interestingly, does not specify when these restrictions will be lifted in order
to allow even a semblance of a run-up to the elections.
The action has come, too, after and amidst unconcealed, army-backed efforts
to create a third political camp to keep the unwanted parties of both the Begums
out. The first choice fell upon Nobel-winning economist Mohammed Yunus, who
started the spadework for a new political party, but wisely abandoned the efforts
after warning signals of what the new role would do to his well-earned reputation.
The army and the caretaker regime, however, have not given up. Their quest
for their own candidate continues. An entertaining example is that of Sadeq
Siddique, who has floated a Jagrata Janata Party (Awakened People's Party).
Hospitalized for an undisclosed ailment, Siddique reportedly left his sick bed
to lead a procession, under army escort, to welcome Hasina's arrest - and returned
to his sick bed at the rally's end!
Washington's apologists may well argue that Washington had no hand in all this.
Veteran watchers of the US mission in Dhaka, however, more than suspect its
role in the developments of the past seven months. No one can prove this, but
few in Bangladesh would believe that the army would have proceeded to act in
this manner without a wink of approval from representatives of the Bush regime.
Some have even suggested that lucrative peacekeeping assignments under the UN
were used as a lever to pressure the army into playing a particular role - avoiding
a direct takeover, but upholstering a new democracy.
Much has been said about middle-class support for the army's anti-corruption
mission. The panegyrics, however, have missed two obvious points. The first
is that, while several luminaries of the AL and the BNP have been detained on
corruption charges, reportedly to the delight of the public, not a single leader
of the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami has been booked on the same grounds. Few
would put this down to the moral purity of the party.
Secondly, and more importantly, the much-vaunted anti-corruption drive has
been proceeding as though Bangladesh knew no such thing as military corruption.
Kickbacks in army purchases and construction projects, in fact, have figured
prominently even in controversies involving political parties in the past. Watchdog
Transparency International has characterized this dimension of Bangladeshi corruption
as "notorious."
The army - under its chief of army staff, General Moeen U Ahmed, who famously
ruled out a return to "elective democracy" in a public speech not
long ago - makes no secret of its post-election strategy. It is openly peddling
and promoting the idea of a national security council, with the power to veto
decisions of an elected government. In other words, the army may appear to stay
in the barracks, but will continue to be the real power behind the facade of
a civilian government.
This is the model which Milam and many others of his persuasion in the US establishment
and think-tanks would seem to have in mind for Pakistan. Off and on, of course,
we hear of Washington's concern for restoration of democracy in that country,
but experience teaches us not to believe our ears readily in this regard.
Said a report in April 2006: "There are indications that the Bush administration
is now imagining a Pakistan without General Pervez Musharraf, according to Stratfor,
an American news and analysis service." According to the report, "this
shift in Washington's thinking will create further domestic problems for the
Pakistani leader, since his political opponents view the US statements as a
signal to intensify their efforts to oust him." The report, however, was
only followed by a reassertion of the Bush regime's support for General Musharraf.
Just over a year later, we were treated to a similar report of a post-Musharraf
"contingency plan," metaphorically in Bush's bag. This, ultimately,
turned out to be the general's own plan with a provision for his succession
by another man in uniform. More recently, the storming of the Lal Masjid was
supposed to signal fresh Musharraf-US strains. Bush, however, set all speculation
at rest by patting Musharraf on the back. It does not appear as if the US president
would embarrass his "anti-teror ally" unduly by any excessive emphasis
on Pakistan's return to a purely civilian democracy.
Turning to Nepal, the pro-US lobby in the Himalayan state has for long been
talking about a "Bangladesh-type" role for the military, noted in
these columns before. In my earlier reports, I have talked repeatedly of the
distinguished part played by James Francis Moriarty, US ambassador to Kathmandu
till July 13. Readers might be interested to learn that Moriarty is now likely
to proceed to Dhaka, as a diplomatic crusader for "democracy."
On the eve of his departure from Nepal, the unconventional diplomat launched
a last offensive against the Maoists, now part of the Eight-Party Alliance (EPA)
and its government. He warned the rest of the parties in the EPA to be wary
of the Communist Party of Nepal - and particularly of the party's alleged attempt
at violation of the agreement "arms management." He did not explicitly
call for the Maoists' exclusion from the general election scheduled for November,
but he did assert that the CPNM had yet to prove itself to be a political party.
Envisaging the success of the army's experiment in Bangladesh and its emulation
in Pakistan, Milam exclaims: "What a boost it would be for the Islamic
world if the two Muslim homelands of South Asia led that world into sustainable
democracy." No harm, he might have added, if an army-sustained democracy
wins in non-Muslim Nepal, too.
A freelance journalist and a peace activist in India, J. Sri Raman is the author of "Flashpoint" (Common Courage Press, USA). He is a regular contributor to Truthout.
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